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Abstract-In times of economic austerity, governments faced with declining revenues and political restraints 
on increasing taxes, must resort to major budgetary cutbacks. However, relatively little is known about how 
the governments of developing countries make expenditure decisions, or perhaps more importantly, how 
they trade off between consumption and investment or between functional categories of expenditures. Some 
sectors are often thought to be more vulnerable than others to reductions; social sectors are usually considered 
more and defense sectors less susceptible. An analysis of Venezuelan military expenditures over the 1950-
1983 period confirms the fact that a high level of stability exists in the country's pattern of defense expenditures 
and that during the country's current period of austerity, defense expenditures are likely to be cutback less 
than other functional expenditures such as health, education and economic development. 
INTRODUCTION 
Venezuela's years of economic boom and easy money 
are over. Income from petroleum exports, which make 
up around 95% of Venezuela's total exports and are 
the barometer of the nation's economic activity, have 
declined significantly in 1983 and 1984, causing serious 
strains on government finances and the economy as a 
whole. 
Assuming that the world petroleum market remains 
stable over the short- and medium-term, prospects 
through the rest of the decade are for very little real 
price growth until the late 1980s. On the other hand, 
it is likely that Venezuela will continue to depend on 
oil as its chief source of income until the end of the 
century and it is not likely that nontraditional exports 
will play a major role in the country's balance of pay-
ments for at least a decade. 
Venezuela is currently experiencing the highest 
unemployment levels in recent years, general dissat-
isfaction with the government, reduced government 
revenues, serious problems in the private sector and 
gloomy short- and medium-term prospects. In short, 
the country today faces a combination of economic, 
financial and social problems greater than any seen 
since the tumultuous days of the early 1960s. Fur-
thermore, because of the recent softness on the wCll'ld 
oil market, Venezuela cannot count on obtaining sub-
stantial sums of hard currency in return for its exports 
of crude and refined products. 
PATTERNS OF AUSTERITY 
In times of economic austerity such as Venezuela is 
currently experiencing, the government, faced with 
declining revenues and political restraints on increasing 
taxes, must resort to major budgetary cutbacks. How-
ever, relatively little is known about how governments 
make expenditure decisions or, perhaps more impor-
tantly, how they trade off between consumption and 
investment or between sectors and categories of ex-
penditures. Anecdotal evidence suggests that officials 
follow rather ad hoc rules for making large contractions 
in a short period of time-cutting new rather than on-
going projects, new rather than present employment, 
materials and travel expenses rather than personnel, 
and favoring ministries that are politically powerful or 
reducing those that had expanded most rapidly in the 
past[!]. 
Some sectors are often thought to be more vulnerable 
than others to reductions; social sectors, in particular, 
are usually considered more and defense sectors less 
susceptible. 
In general [2], the programs, once enlarged, seem 
difficult to reduce, particularly if they generate large 
employment benefits. Likewise, governments seem 
unwilling to reduce areas that are supported by foreign 
assistance, both because they fear antagonizing aid do-
nors and for the more practical reason that savings 
from such expenditure cuts are significantly less, since 
aid is also reduced by a proportionate amount. 
As to the choice of which sectors to cut back, it is 
often felt that some sectors are more "vulnerable" than 
others to reductions. The defense sector, particularly, 
is usually considered difficult to reduce, while other 
sectors, particularly the social sectors such as health, 
education and rural development are considered vul-
nerable. The alleged vulnerability of the social sectors 
is clearly evident in writings coming from the World 
Bank, as the following quotes indicate: 
In the difficult past few years, budgetary crises have often 
meant that social services were cut back, in the process un-
ravelling carefully designed programs [3]. 
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Since many human development programs are publicly 
funded, they are especially vulnerable when growth is threat-
ened and budgets are under pressure . . . The recurrent costs 
of social programs, especially salary costs, tended to make 
them a permanent and, therefore, vulnerable part of govern-
ment budgets [4]. 
Quick-fix relief through disproportionate cutbacks-in, for 
example, education or rural development-may well have 
negative consequences for the entire economy [5]. 
Many member countries have had to reduce and reorient 
investment programs to curtail recurrent expenditures and to 
delay the completion of high priority development projects. 
Programs in health, education and other social sectors have 
been particularly vulnerable [6]. 
In the crisis situations confronting African governments, 
education, training and health programs are continuously in 
danger of becoming the residual legatees of both resources 
and of attention by policymakers [7]. 
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Despite these rather strongly held views and such 
circumstantial evidence, little empirical investigation 
has been made on the vulnerability of different sectors 
to reductions in public expenditures. In a recent study 
[8] of37 cases ofbudgetary reductions (countries where 
real expenditures declined in one or more years), the 
vulnerability of different sectors to budgetary reduc-
tion was examined. Here, vulnerability was loosely de-
fined as: 
l. A sector was well-protected if expenditures on it 
were reduced by less than the percent of reduction in 
total expenditures. 
2. A sector was vulnerable if its percentage of re-
duction exceeded the average. 
In brief, a simple ratio of percentage changes in sectoral 
expenditures to those in total spending served as the 
measure of vulnerability. Where the ratio had a greater 
value than one, it indicated that the sector was highly 
vulnerable, while a value between zero and one indi-
cated low vulnerability, with less than proportional re-
ductions in the relevant sector. A negative value in-
dicated that despite overall expenditure reductions, the 
sector was allowed to expand. 
The result (Table l) based on an aggregation of the 
results from 37 observations, showed an average decline 
of 13% in real government expenditures, while the de-
cline for the social sectors was only 5%, producing a 
vulnerability index of0.4. By contrast, the index is 0.6 
for administrative/defense sectors and over l for pro-
duction and infrastructure. In short, social sectors were 
less vulnerable to cuts than defense and administration, 
which in tum were considerably less y'.ulnerable than 
production and infrastructure-contrary to the gen-
erally accepted view. The fact that social sectors and 
defense were both relatively protected suggests that 
there were high political costs associated with reducing 
them. On the other hand, countries appeared to have 
been more willing to cut spending on infrastructure 
and production which had adverse implications for 
longer-term growth prospects but fewer early, direct 
and immediate political costs. 
These conclusions were not very different for coun-
tries belonging to different income groups. The low 
income countries (Table l) appear to have afforded 
slightly more protection to the social sectors and pro-
duction and slightly less to administration and defense, 
but the difference was marginal. The middle income 
countries, such as Venezuela and Argentina, by con-
trast gave more protection to administration and de-
fense and less to the productive and infrastructural 
sectors. 
The apparent bias toward maintaining expenditures 
in the social services and defense may reflect the gov-
ernment's preference for present consumption over 
investment and future consumption, since social sec-
tors and defense typically have a heavy bias toward 
recurrent expenditures and within these there is a siz-
able employment component. Politicians in Venezuela, 
particularly in election years, may find it more ac-
ceptable to reduce investment, growth and future con-
sumption, especially ifthese reductions are uncertain 
and far off, than to make politically difficult cost cuts 
in present consumption. Since the social sectors and 
defense/administration are relatively labor intensive 
with high recurrent costs, reducing expenditures on 
them not only cuts back services highly valued by the 
public, but also causes relatively high unemployment 
per unit of reduction. 
THE VENEZUELAN CASE 
These general observations on the manner in which 
governments deal with austerity seem to hold fairly 
well historically for Venezuela. Since 1950, there have 
been six years (not including 1984, for which exact 
official data is still pending) of overall real cuts in gov-
ernment expenditure: 1959, 1960, 1962, 1979, 1982, 
and 1983. In the earlier period, 1959 and 1960, military 
expenditures were reduced in line with overall expen-
ditures in 1959 and slightly more in 1960. Starting in 
1962, however, military expenditures have been re-
duced 4% compared to overall government expenditure 
reductions of 12% in 1962, 0.4% in contrast to overall 
government reductions of 15.3% in 1979, and 3.9% 
compared to an overall expenditure cut of 8.6% in 
1982. The reduction of military expenditure by 0.8% 
in 1983 is certainly less than the actual overall reduc-
tion in real government expenditures for that year. 
In examining longer term patterns in national prior-
ities, various indices of Venezuela's military expen-
ditures are available: 
I. The nation's military expenditure as a percentage 
of GNP; 
2. Per capita military expenditure-military ex-
penditure divided by the nation's population; 
3. The number of personnel in the nation's armed 
forces per se; 
Table I. Impact of reduction in government expenditures 
e ense 
Social Administration Production Infrastructure Miscellaneous 
Average percent change in -5 -8 -11 -22 
real expenditures 
Index of Vulnerability 0.4 0.6 1.2 1. 7 
Low income (17 observatons) 0.2 0.9 0.6 1.2 
Middle income (20 observations) 0.5 0.4 1. 7 1.9 
Source: Norman Hicks and Anne Ku bi sch, "Cutting Government Expenditures in LDCs" Finance and Development 





Notes: Capital and recurring expenditures for 32 developing countries for various periods during 1972-80. · 
~I 
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Table 2. Venezuela: Patterns of military expenditures, 1950-1983 
(Millions of Bolivares) 
Nominal Real Growth in Growth in Growth in 
Real ~i!itary Expenaitures as a% of 
Real Real Real 
Military Military Real Military Real Gov Real Gov Real Government Government Government 
Expenditure Expenditure Expendf ture Expenditure Revenue GDP Consumption Expenditures Revenues 
1950 182.0 505.5 
- -
1951 201.0 555.2 9.8 10.0 17 .5 1.54 11.38 8.77 9.49 
1952 212.0 577.7 4.1 1.6 4.8 1.54 11.55 8.76 8.87 
1953 210.0 581.7 0.5 4.8 7.0 1.52 11.58 8.97 8.80 
1954 270.0 745.9 28.2 6.2 3.6 1.42 10.94 8.62 8.29 
1955 338.0 936.3 25.6 15.4 13.2 1.65 12.74 10.41 10.25 
1956 381.0 1046.7 11.8 11.3 45.9 1.89 15.09 11.33 11.38 
1957 496.0 1393 .3 33.2 33.7 26.4 1.87 16.71 11.38 8. 71 
1958 601.0 1606.9 15.4 35.6 -17.1 2;08 19.38 11.33 9.71 > 1959 607 .o 1548.5 -3.7 -3.7 10.3 2.45 16.83 9.63 12.77 c 
1960 540.0 1330.l -14.1 -10.7 -11.9 2.37 19.39 9.64 11.15 ~ 
1961 533.0 1349.4 1.4 6.4 -16.5 2.10 14.67 9.27 10.86 ::i. 
-<' 1962 509.0 • 1295. 2 -4.0 -12.0 2.6 1.97 14.68 8.84 9.20 
"' 1963 613.0 1544.l 19.2 12.2 10.5 1.72 14.34 9.64 8.61 ::s c::>. 
1964 650.0 160U.0 3.7 5.3 5.7 1.90 14.84 10.24 9.29 3 
1965 742.0 1796.6 12.2 8.6 0.1 1.82 15.37 10.09 9.11 ~ 1966 782.0 1681.9 3.6 5.8 4.9 1.96 15.85 10.42 10.21 Q 1967 885.0 2107 .1 13.2 10.7 10.2 1.97 15.27 10.21 10.08 
"' 1968 894.0 2103.5 -0.1 5.0 1.6 2.12 16.29 10.43 10.36 ;.. 
'g 1969 867.0 1988.5 -5.5 4.2 3.9 1.99 16.08 9.91 10.19 ::s 
1970 891.0 1993.3 0.2 1.5 14.2 1.87 14.72 8.99 10.01 ~ 
1971 1113.0 2414.3 21.l 7.5 18.8 1.70 12.93 8.88 8.78 c iil 1972 1294.0 2729.9 13.1 11.2 2.5 1.94 14.34 10.00 8.96 
"' 1973 1400.0 2834.0 3.8 7.6 24.5 2.10 15.22 10.17 9.88 
1974 2022.0 3779.4 33.3 47.7 141.1 1.91 14.59 9.81 8.24 
1975 2520.0 4278.4 13.2 9.6 -13.1 1.80 15.83 8.85 4.56 
1976 1997 .o 3149.8 -26.4 10.l -12 .7 2.10 15.81 
"( 9.15 5.94 1977 2472.0 3614.0 14.8 19.9 7.6 1.47 10.10 6.ll 5.01 
1978 2673.0 3651.6 1.0 2.5 -0.3 1.58 10.77 5.85 5.76 
1979 2993.0 3635.7 -0.4 -15.3 19.1 1.58 11.ll 5.76 6.25 
1980 3893.0 3893 .0 7.1 4.1 30.5 1.44 10.78 6.79 5.88 
1981 4550.0 3922.4 0.7 30.4 46.7 1.53 11.08 6.98 5.86 
1982 4800.0 3770.6 -3.9 -8.6 -14.1 1.59 10.67 5.39 4.66 
1983 5060.0 3739.8 -0.8 
- -
1.77 12.27 
OTES: Nominal Milftary Expenditures taken from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Yearbook, various 
isssues. Real military expenditures dervied by deflating with the International Monitary 1 F~nd tonsu~rdprice index for Venezuela (1980 = 1.00. Govermient re~enue.and expenditures from Interna iona one ary un , 
International Financial statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
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4. The number of military personnel divided by 
population; 
5. Military expenditure divided by the number of 
military personnel; 
6. Military expenditure per se; 
7. Military expenditure as a percentage of the federal 
budget; 
8. Military expenditure as a percentage o(govern-
ment consumption; 
9. Military expenditure as a percentage of govern-
ment revenues. 
Of these, the most often and widely used is the first, 
military expenditure as a percentage of GNP. Clearly, 
however, there are some major problems with this par-
ticular measure. For example, the largest proportion 
of GNP is unavailable for direct allocation by national 
leaders and policymakers and, thus, the percent-GNP 
measure cannot demonstrate the priorities of such pol-
icymakers. In addition, since Venezuela's GNP is rel-
atively large by Third World standards, it takes large 
changes in military expenditure to appear as anything 
more than a change of a few tenths of one percent in 
such an index. 
As with the examination of austerity measures 
above, real military expenditure as a percentage of the 
nation's federal budget is probably the most useful 
measure of longer run movements in national priori-
ties. It focuses precisely on the priorities of the nation's 
policymakers. By this measure, it is clear that there 
have been at least six major cycles (Table 2) in Ven-
ezuela's pattern of defense expenditures: 
I. The 1951-54 period found Venezuelan military 
expenditure averaging 8.78% of government expen-
ditures; 
2. The 1955-58 period saw an upswing in defense 
spending, which during this period averaged 11.11 % 
of total Central Government expenditures; 
3. The 1959-63 period showed a downturn in de-
fense expenditures, which averaged 9.4% of federal 
spending; 
4. A slight upturn occurred between 1964 and 1968, 
with defense expenditures averaging 10.3% of the fed-
eral government's budgets; 
5. Two downturns have occurred since 1968, the 
first from 1969 to 197 6, when defense spending av-
eraged 9.47% of the federal budget, and 
6. During the period from 1977 to 1983, when de-
fense expenditures averaged 7.58% of the federal 
budget. • 
Despite several cyclical patterns, military expendi-
tures in Venezuela generally seem to enjoy a particular 
stability and are not all that vulnerable to financial-
austerity-induced cutbacks. The stability in military 
expenditures is also apparent (Table 2) in examining 
longer term trends in the ratios of military expenditure 
to other major macroeconomic aggregates. In terms of 
real gross domestic product, military expenditures have 
averaged between 1.5 and 2 percent over the 1950 to 
1983 period. 
In terms of the shares ofreal government consump-
tion or real government revenues, however, military 
expenditure seems to be somewhat more volatile. Sev-
eral cyclical patterns seem to emerge: 
I. In terms of real government revenues, a more 
stable pattern appears, with less fluctuation over time 
and fewer major cycles in military expenditure. 
2. Military expenditure shows most stability in 
terms of the government's real level of consumption. 
3. The link between all measures of economic ac-
tivity-real GDP, real government expenditure, real 
government revenues and real government consump-
tion and real defense expenditure seems to be weak-
ening, i.e., there does not appear to be the degree of 
stability in the 1970s and 1980s that characterized the 
period of the 1950s and 1960s. 
4. The historical stability in defense expenditures 
would seem to indicate that the government's current 
austerity measures will not result in major cutbacks in 
military-related activities. 
CONCLUSIONS 
On one hand, the results presented above suggest 
that a high level of stability exists in Venezuelan defense 
expenditures but that this stability may not hold up 
during the country's current period of austerity. On 
the other hand, the results suggest that cutbacks in de-
fense expenditures are likely to be much lower than in 
other functional areas. 
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